from the scientific models sketched in that work significant, for it shows Coleridge transferring which suffused his intellectual life at the time to a criticism. Probably no other alteration in the lang has affected the practice of criticism more.
Coleridge's prolific response to the medical con the composition of the Biographia Literaria was of many years of reading and thinking about scie at Christ's Hospital, Coleridge flirted on and off try; and his meeting in 1799 with Humphry D the beginning of a friendship that inspired Coler for his poetry and solutions to his own metaphysi research. In one of the rare articles on Colerid Coburn relates how, at its outset, this friendship b new chemistry and the father of the new criticis tive: Coleridge shared much of Davy's scientific r searched for the laws within the impalpable, w searching out laws of substances hitherto unknow neath the static appearance of the stone, or the p the flame, the loud bang, the explosive energy. Th by the revelation of unsuspected relationships things, inanimate as well as animate." It is not su ridge's and Davy's descriptions of the poet and th are strikingly similar, or that "Coleridge's descrip eraria of the imagination derives at least some from the fact that although he is talking about t might in places equally be talking about Davy's ch 2 Kathleen Coburn, "Coleridge, a Bridge Between Sci tions on the Bicentenary of his Birth," in Coleridge 's V don, 1974) , 91, 95. My entire essay is indebted to some article, and I am more generally indebted to M. H. Abr in Sound': Science, Metascience, and Imagination," Proc Philosophical Society, 116 (1972) , 458-75. In addition has informed me of one of Coleridge's richer scientific his Notebooks (ed. Kathleen Coburn), no. 3116 (f. 1 "Red, Green, and Violet the only colors," and tries mixtures of two colors accordingly. His Idea come Young's new theory -now called the Young-Helmholtz searched the Philosophical Transactions for the period she missed Young's article: "Production of Colours" system of the primary colors. It was published in the The theory is presented again in Young's Lectures on N XXXVII (1807). Others, like David Brewster, continued red, yellow, and blue were the primaries because paint by these and the mixture of two or all three. It's p Young's text because it's not in the first article he pub in a correction in a later page in the same volume.
Schapiro for the above information.
It is important to realize, however, that these affinities between Coleridge and Davy are based on Davy's work around 1802, ten years before the waning of their intellectual friendship. Coleridge avidly followed Davy's 1802 lectures and read his work for many years after; but the famous marginal note to Boehme's Aurora (1612) summarizes the vicissitudes of a relationship strained by the demands of modern science:
O how gladly would I resign my life . . . to procure for mankind such health and longevity to H. Davy, as should enable him to discover the Element of metals, of Sulphur and of Carbon. O! he will do it! Yea and may perhaps revea the synthetic Idea of the Antithets, Attraction and Repulsion.
S. T. C.
Alas! since I wrote the preceding note H. Davy is become Sir Humph and an Atomist!3 As M. H. Abrams illustrates in The Mirror and the Lamp, using writers like Keats as examples, the personal misunderstandings between Davy and Coleridge were in part a product of general rift in England between science and poetry in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Coleridge belonging to the poetic school of spirit and imagination and Davy often tending toward a progressive science which was becoming increasingly mechanistic and materialistic. Davy, in fact, never totally accepted the theories of atomists like Dalton, and he and Coleridge would always remain distant admirers. Yet the gap that atomistic science was creating between poetry and science made it increasingly difficult for them to share and discuss philosophies. Unhappily for the poets, the disparity between the two disciplines could only diminish poetry's value, as scientists claimed that the poetic vision was a fantastic way of knowing with little relevance to the scientific laws of nature. For Coleridge, this claim-that there was an inherent and inescapable conflict between science and poetry-was intolerable, for if the scientific validity of imaginative perception could not be maintained, the moral principles founded on that imaginative perception would be in danger of dissipating as ethereal musings. Thus in the Treatise on Method (1818) he bemoans a world suffering "from a The battle lines on the two questions were clearly drawn. Operating from an avowed theological foundation, Abernethy "could accept no physical science that did violence to his conception of spirit."7 The life force, he maintained, was independent of organization and structure and prior to it, for the priority of function to structure was essential to the concept of functional unity in any organism. Lawrence, on the other hand, kept his biology and his theology segregated. For him, that an organism was the product of organization was an irrefragable scientific fact, independent of religious questions. Regarding the second question, it is almost needless to point out that Lawrence, the laboratory worker, strongly objected to theories and hypotheses and minimized the role of speculation in scientific labor as much as possible. But Abernethy made the most of theory and hypotheses, and "justified them on grounds that suggest the instrumentalist's point of view; he justified them, that is, on grounds of the concrete investigation that they provoked and controlled." 7a If these were the questions Hunter's work raised and the solutions each faction loudly proclaimed, it goes without saying that both Abernethy and Lawrence discovered in Hunter what they wanted to discover, a way of responding that Coleridge was equally guilty of when he entered the ring of the debate. After rehearsing the quarrel, in his "Theory of Life," Coleridge hails Abernethy's role in developing "the true idea of life," a dynamic philosophy like Coleridge's own which gave priority to 5 Sir William Lawrence, Introduction to Comparative Anatomy (1816), 169. function over structure and emphasized the laws of nature rather than the arrangement of particles. "In Mr. Abernethy's Lecture on the Theory of Life," Coleridge writes, "it is impossible not to see a presentiment of a great truth. ... If the opinions here supported are the same with those of Mr. Abernethy I rejoice in his authority. If they are different, I shall wait with anxious interest for an exposition of that difference."8 Thoroughly idiosyncratic, "Theory of Life" is Coleridge's defense of Hunter's and Abernethy's vitalism; it attempts to prove and to illustrate that "Life itself is not a thing-a self-subsistent hypostasis-but an act and a process" (TL, 430) . The arrangement of separate bodies or atoms does not explain life; rather, "The most comprehensive formula to which life is reducible, would be that of the internal copula of bodies, or ... the power which discloses itself from within as a principle of unity in the many" (TL, 384). To prove these claims Coleridge presents a detailed outline of the evolution of life as it manifests itself through the conjunction of three forces, magnetism, electricity, and what Coleridge labeled "chemical affinity." Not surprisingly, each of these forces plays an important role in Biographia Literaria.
In its intent and language, "Theory of Life" is clearly a scientific tract, directed at a scientific audience and employing the scientific discourse that Coleridge knew from his attendance at Royal Society lectures and his indefatigable reading of such scientific journals as William Nicholson's Journal of Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, and the Arts and the Royal Society's Philosophical Transactions. There is some difficulty, though, in isolating a "scientific discourse" in 1815, since a specialized language for science is only just emerging at this time, just as a specialized thinker called a scientist is only just beginning to be recognized.9 Coleridge obviously belongs to an earlier tradition where the scientist is first of all a natural philosopher, perhaps best described by the passage from the Republic which Coleridge translates as his epigraph to an essay in The Friend (1818); Plato distinguishes here between mere "Philotheorists," and "those whom alone you may rightly denominate Philosophers, as knowing what the science of all three branches of science is, which may prove something more than the mere aggregate of the knowledge of any particular science.""0 Nineteenth-century scientists, however, could not be comfortable with this archaic conception of their role. They needed the precision provided by specialization in thought and language. So while Coleridge disparages Davy "who seems more and more determined to mould himself upon the Age, in order to make the Age mould itself upon that "in all pure phaenomena we behold only the copula, the balance or indifference of opposite energies." Moreover, in the same letter after discussing speculative science, physiology, and "Demiurgic atoms," Coleridge asks "What is all this to the world at large?" His answer goes some way in explaining why he does not confine scientific language to a scientific treatise, but transfers it to other fields, notably the field of literature in Biographia Literaria. Throughout history, he argues, science or natural philosophy has maintained so direct a structural correspondence with other cultural phenomena that this correspondence "must remain inexplicable, unless we admit not only a reaction and interdependence on both sides, but a powerful, the most indirect influence" of science on the other fields of knowledge. Using examples of art from the medieval period and the eighteenth century, he comments, in a way that might anticipate the twentieth-century philosopher Michel Foucault, "these are all but the ribs, abutments and sea-marks of a long line of correspondencies in the arts of Taste to the opposite coast of speculative Philosophy." In short systems of thought and signification affect the structure of contemporaneous systems, so that an error in a system like speculative philosophy or science could be disseminated throughout other systems. Thus, the "recent relapse ... of the Chemists to the atomistic scheme, and the almost unanimous acceptance of Dalton's Theory in England, & Le Sage's in France determine the intellectual character of the age with the force of an experimentum crucis;" 14 and even poetry is in danger of being degraded by a mechanistic science whose laws and models will inevitably affect literary criticism and poetry. There is a "link or mordaunt by which philosophy becomes scientific and sciences philosophical,"15 and likewise there is a link between science and poetry which would allow for the corruption of poetry by science and the substantiation of both through the truth they share. "If in the greatest poets we find Nature idealized through the creative power of a profound yet observant meditation, so through the medi tative observation of a Davy, a Wollaston, a Hatchett, or a Murray, ... we find poetry, as it were, substantiated and realized." l In 1815 Coleridge's task, then, was to establish the connections between his scientific models and the realm of poetry, connections which the scientific community especially were ignoring or denying. In the perspective of Coleridge's visionary philosophy, these connections were clearly present; he needed, however, to substantiate and realize them for the world at large and specifically for his scientific competitors. The solution was in language; and ease and accuracy in transferring the language o "Theory of Life"-the scientists' own inbred tongue-to Biographia Literaria became the most direct and effective way of illustrating th commensurability, even the authority, of both Coleridge's science and his poetics.
The way scientific language permeates literary definitions and practical criticism will be my primary concern here; and these areas of Biographia Literaria generally relate to the biological issue of function versus structural arrangement. But the second topic of these debates, the value of theory in investigative research, also plays a large role in the Biographia. This second issue is naturally less directly involved with language itself, and, further, critics of Coleridge are more apt to discuss it, though rarely in the context of the medical debates which greatly influenced Coleridge's thinking about theory. Snyder notes that during the medical debates, Coleridge was forced into a fundamental consideration of the processes of thought. There resulted a vivid realization of the extent to which all thinking is determined by assumptions, ideas, images, and attitudes of even less tangible sorts. Coleridge's 14 Collected Letters, IV, 758-62. 15 The Friend, I, 463. 1 Treatise on Method, 25.
insistence that fertilized thinking involved more more than what is commonly meant to empiri critical part of reasoning, and that they depen understanding-on a power that brings into p ciples of thought and method were formulated th philosophical minds, but to no small extent the chemical controversies in which he took part.17
More specifically, Coleridge was faced with a method based on theory and Lawrence's me based on observation exclusively. He rejecte his own method based on law, a method de Kant.17a A scientific definition, Coleridge should be neither a theory nor a generalizatio law of the thing, or in such an idea of it, as b ties and functions are admitted by implicatio causal, that a full insight having been attaine it a progressive insight into the necessity and ena of which it is the law" (TL, 370). In M Coleridge's Criticism, J. R. de J. Jackson t vidual preference for "law over theory," h correct and usually standard.l8 According to mines the method; the specific ends determin a scientist like Abernethy apprehends truth, gence," through material evidence, and must of theory which is primarily an educated gue The poet, on the other hand, apprehends inte the material substance to the essence of phen and then presenting the law in the language not depend on the material world for his k lows Coleridge's thought quite accurately, b qualifications to add to his discussion: firs ridge argues, in opposition to speculative scien based on law, suggesting therefore the same ence; and secondly, explaining method in overlooks the reader-critic whose method is d who is the real subject of Biographia Lite amount of time and space Coleridge uses t that he is discussing a way of investigating p poem, that he is explaining poetry, not accou may be fine distinctions, they are very impo distinctions that the medical debates most ob 17a Kant defined "nature in general" as "the con ances the Biographia: in 1815 the scientific method that Coleridge urges on both Abernethy and Lawrence is one based on law, and accordingly, the critical methodology he proposes and uses in Biographia Literaria depends on philosophical law. Both the scientist and the critic work with more or less refined material data, and for both only Coleridge's procedure based on law can guarantee objectivity and accuracy. In short, though the critic, the poet, and the scientist all search out law, the critic reading the poem is more like the scientist investigating a chemical reaction than like a poet writing a poem. Investigating poetry in 1815, then, Coleridge works according to his self-defined scientific method in which laws are the lamps of good research, and, as in biological research, these laws "of poetry cannot be given from without" but "are the very powers of growth and reproduction"'9 which the critic must perceive. Here, as in every science, "it is the essence of a scientific definition to be causative, . . . by announcing the law of action in the particular case, in subordination to the common law of which all phenomena are modifications or results" (TL, 370). Thus in Biographia Literaria Coleridge's theoretical definitions do not describe how to make a poem or propose generalized standards or theories against which to measure a poem; they describe instead the laws of poetry as formal causes in every poem, and Coleridge's criticisms of Wordsworth, for instance, point out deviations from these laws. Appropriately, Coleridge's tone and method is that of a biologist noting freakish deviations in the laws of nature. After presenting the primary laws-polarity, the secondary imagination, the laws of meter-he examines his material in their light; concentrating on Wordsworth and Shakespeare he explains how their works function and where they fall short of the ideal laws of poetry. Thus the organic metaphor, for Coleridge, does not account for a poem but explains the ideal laws of its formation; and Coleridge is far less concerned with the personality behind the poem-William Wordsworth or William Shakespeare-than with the product those two minds generate.
The issue of theory versus law, however, is only indirectly a product of the scientific language in Biographia Literaria. The language itself is a much more immediate and powerful presence, and one of the more The highest perfection of natural philosophy would consist in the perfect spiritualization of all laws of nature into laws of intuition and intellect. The phaenomena (the material) must wholly disappear, and the laws alone (the formal) must remain. ... The optical phaenomena are but a geometry, the lines of which are drawn by light, and the materiality of this light itself has already become a matter of doubt. In the appearance of magnetism all trace of matter is lost, and of the phaenomena of gravitation . . . there remains nothing but its law, the execution of which on a vast scale is the mechanism of the heavenly motions. (BL I, 175) Further, Coleridge himself suggests what the evolutionary scheme of "Theory of Life" means to the practicing artist. "Each thing that lives," he writes in his essay "On Poesy or Art," has "its moment of self-exposition, and so has each period of each thing"; "each step of nature hath its ideal, and . . . the possibility of climax up to the perfect form of a harmonized chaos." Therefore, the "artist must imitate that which is within the thing, that which is active through form and figure, and discourse to us by symbols-the Natur-geist, ... for so only can he hope to produce any work truly natural in the object and truly human in the effect" (BL, 259, 262). Contrast this description of imitation to Coleridge's earlier and vaguer distinction between imitation and copying, and it is obvious how his scientific scheme of evolution elaborates and extends that original notion of imitation. The scientific language transforms the earlier simplistic and static definition of imitation as "a combination of a certain degree of dissimilitude with a certain degree of similitude" into a more dynamic, evolutionary concept that anticipates the pseudo-scientific poetics of Hulme and others.20 A final and more concrete example of Coleridge's transferring the language of scientific discourse to the definitions and literary principles in Biographia Literaria is his description of genius, specifically of Wordsworth's genius. Out of context the statement on Wordsworth's development seems an ungainly simile; however, in the context of the medical debate whose occasion and primary issue was the nature of physiological disorders and diseases, the language reverberates with a special biological significance:
it is remarkable how soon genius clears and purifies itself from the faults and errors of its earliest products; faults which, in its earliest compositions, are the 20 Shakespearan Criticism, ed. T. M. Raysor (London, 1960) , II, 53. That the language here and in Biographia Literaria often comes directly from Schlegel or Schelling does not weaken my argument since it is the use of the scientific discourse that matters, not its origin. more obtrusive and confluent, because as heterogeneous elements, which h only a temporary use, they constitute the very ferment, by which they themselves are carried off. Or we may compare them to some disease, which mu work on humours, and be thrown out on the surface, in order to secure t patient from their future recurrence. (BL I, (57) (58) Here Coleridge's language produces a meaning insofar as it suggests rather peculiar, biological understanding of how genius develops an how artistic faults correct themselves. Express this idea in different term and a different idea takes its place.2'
In each of these examples, I am drawing attention to the scientif language itself as the formative agent in Coleridge's pronouncements on literature. Hence, my position is opposite that of most critics who vi the scientific language as a metaphor in a monistic system that merg different terminologies. Coleridge's monistic vision is undeniable, but th scientific discourse is clearly more than metaphoric-or at least meta phors and similes have a greater role and a more complicated functi than most critics have observed in the past. If Coleridge's vision is moni tic, his understanding is pluralistic.2
In a recent article Jonathan Culler makes a similar point about th connotative power and cultural significance of two of Coleridge's mo important critical terms, allegory and symbol. Culler begins his analysis of Coleridge by describing the structural differences which distinguish allegorical sign from a symbolic sign: "The allegorical sign, we migh say, is arbitrary: the connection between signifier and signified is impose by the mind or fancy, while the eye and imagination are aware primari of the difference. The symbol, on the other hand, is a motivated sign, a synecdoche, in which the signifier is naturally connected to the signified This distinction relates, in turn, to the opposition between mechanical a organic form, the allegory being identified with the mechanical and the symbol with the organic. We thus have here two fundamental tropes or codes, or "two ways of organizing the attribution of meaning," the allegorical and the symbolic. And according to Culler, a general doctrinal or cultural "shift in formal operations for the production of meaning" counts for Coleridge's preference for the symbolic.23 21 Discussing Coleridge's use of the word "polarity," J. Isaacs makes this sam point in "Coleridge's Critical Terminology," Essays and Studies (Oxford, 193 XXI, 82. He notes: "this is not merely a loose employment of the normal use of the word. ... The fact that this use is a subtle and thought-out transference of the term to the great central problem of multeity in unity, gives an emotiona significance of the highest order to this otherwise cold technical term." 221 have argued this point more fully, and have provided a hermetical founda tion for it -a foundation derived from Coleridge's views on reading, language, and understanding -in "Coleridge, the Reader: Language in a Combustible
Mind." This article will appear in a forthcoming issue of Philological Quarterly (Winter 1980) . 23 "Literary History, Allegory, and Semiology," New Literary History, 7
(Winter, 1976), 263-64.
Culler, I believe, overstates this last point, tions for the production of meaning is less a than it is, first of all, a product of his contem and an organismic trope. That is, Coleridge's is, above all else, connected with scientific of his day, especially with the new organic describes in terms of scientific research of t of knowledge, such as history, were undergo mology, but science was clearly providing the formal operations in language do not chang but alter because of changes in the operat which, in turn, affect the formal operations it. Such is the case here, and Culler, perhaps when he depends on the biological term "org tic shift in other discourses such as history.
Coleridge's 1816 distinction between allegor most famous critical definitions and tools, in many of his literary maxims at this time deri tific discourse. I have already shown how in tific language is transferred directly to a liter cal principles which have made Coleridge f In those examples, the scientific language p explicitly meant to organize the attribution that reading a poem as either allegorical or sy cussions regarding how and what the poem the scientific discourse controls much of t graphia Literaria; and, though scientific lang on Coleridge's descriptions and judgments o as often these critical interpretations are m code or model which supplements the primar meaning one would be hard pressed to loca The features of the text which this scientific are naturally predetermined by the code itse which has been arguing the priority of fun medical audience will accordingly be directed poem.
So much has been written about Coleridge's formal criticism and his organic model that it is not necessary to rehash points that have become commonplaces. What is worth attention, though, are the elaborations on that trope which follow from Coleridge's more subtle thinking about science in 1815, and the way these elaborations manifest themselves in the practical criticism of Biographia Literaria. For instance, Coleridge's ground for differentiating poetry and prose, the first truly practical problem in the Biographia, immediately recalls the first issue of the medical controversy over mechanical structure vs. organic function:
A poem contains the same elements as a prose composition; the difference therefore must consist in a different combination of them, in consequence of a different object being proposed. According to the difference of the object will be the difference of the combination. It is possible, that the object may b merely to facilitate the recollection of any given facts or observations by artificial arrangement; and the composition will be a poem, merely because it is distinguished from prose by meter, or by rhyme, or by both conjointly. (BL II, 8) In short, what differentiates poetry and prose is not mere arrangement of "elements," as the mechanistic scientists would argue, but the function of the two forms, the "object being proposed" by each.
The emphasis on function over arrangement informs the vast majority of critical judgments in Biographia Literaria; and, as Coleridge attempt to employ this formula in different and more subtle ways when analyzing poems, scientific tropes and biological descriptions more overtly prejudice the judgments. In fact, biological descriptions and connotations are so ubiquitous that the scientific world of plants and organisms merges with the literary world. Differentiating Wordsworth's and Coleridge's natural world, Abrams notes that the "nature" Coleridge "ultimately appeals to in art is basically a biological nature," and it "is astonishing how much of Coleridge's critical writing is couched in terms that are metaphorica for art and literal for plants. . . . Only let the vehicle of his metaphor come alive, and you see all the objects of criticism writhe surrealistically into plants or parts of plants, growing in tropical profusion."24 Indeed
Coleridge's prefatory statement on Wordsworth's "Descriptive Sketches" is a description of an organic jungle:
seldom, if ever, was the emergence of an original genius above the literary horizon more evidently announced. In the form, style, and manner of the whol poem, and in the structure of particular lines and periods, there is an harshness and acerbity connected and combined with words and images all a-glow, which might recall those products of the vegetable world, where gorgeous blossoms rise out of the hard and thorny rind and shell, within which the rich fruit was elaborating. The language was not only peculiar and strong, but at times knotty part model from science to poetry is that distinguish different operations in a poem w unity on the evidence that, as in the biolo Life," "the lower powers are assimilated, n presupposes homogeneity" (TL, 386). Of the three powers which Coleridge describes in "Theory of Life," magnetism or polarity is the one he most frequently discusses. In "Theory of Life" he makes it clear that, as the most basic force in nature, magnetism is the first expression of the polarity principle; and in this state it is predominantly mechanical, "two equal forces acting in opposite directions" (BL I, 197) . Barfield, without doubt the most lucid explicator of polarity, makes the crucial point that the mechanical law of polarity must be distinguished from the power of polarity; for if magnetism is an essentially mechanical law, it eventually becomes assimilated into a higher power which is essentially dynamic. In their most primitive form, before their conversion into a vital power, the poles of a magnet provide an object with fixity: the magnetic poles are "the primary constituent Powers."26 As Seth Watson observes in his introduction to "Theory of Life," magnetism thus becomes the "first and simplest differential act of Natur ... the first step from indifference to difference, from formless homogeneity to independent existence" (TL, 360).
In a poem this rudimentary act of fixity and differentiation is described by the famous pairs which comprise all poems and which become objectified elements in the poem-"sameness with difference; of the general, with the concrete; the idea, with the image; the individual, with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, with old and familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion, with more than usual order" (BL II, 12). These differentiate a poem, define it, and balance it, as i were, in a fixed position. Balance, in fact, is the key to the polar arrangement in a poem, just as it is in a magnet, for "in all pure phaenomena we behold only the copula, the balance or indifference of opposite ener gies."27 Accordingly, where Wordsworth's feelings are "disproportionate to such knowledge and value of objects described" the stability of the poem is upset; and accusing Wordsworth of mental bombast is a criticism of misbalanced energies (BL II, 109). Likewise, Coleridge complains of metaphysical poets and some of his contemporaries who in different ways destroy the balance needed in a poem. "Our faulty elder poets sacrificed the passion and passionate flow of poetry to the subtleties of intellect, and to the starts of wit; the moderns to the glare and glitter of a perpetual, yet broken and heterogeneous imagery, or rather to an amphibious something, made up, half of image, and half of abstract meaning. The one sacrificed the heart to the head; the other both heart and head to poin and drapery" (BL I, 15).
Because Coleridge himself rarely dissected his polarity principle and only in "Theory of Life" and in his long letter to Tulk in 1817 made a sus tained attempt to show clearly how it relates to the magnetic law as op-posed to the electrical power, critics often co ism and the polarity of electricity. But in or intricacies of the criticism in Biographia Lit of imagination, one must be aware of the polarity is the first law of nature, and magn and repulsion is the first manifestation of t magnetism generate a second force, electricit izes the fixed magnetic field and stands as th (Magnetism and electricity become interse two poles.) In Coleridge's evolutionary schem fests itself most obviously in inorganic meta trical force becomes predominant, vegetab from the conjunction of electricity and magn the different forms of life are made. In the the magnetic poles, "life subsists"; in their s ity, "it [life] consists" (TL, 393).
The addition of this life-producing pow scheme should never be underestimated. Seth Watson went so far as to say that electricity was "the foundation of life" for Coleridge. This is of course an exaggeration, a point Coleridge made abundantly clear in "Theory of Life" where electricity functions only as a primary manifesta tion of one power in life. Yet, electricity did provide an illustration and scientific solution to a scientific scheme that associates magnetism with lifeless arrangement. A "new light was struck by the discovery of electricity, and in every sense of the word, . . . it may be affirmed to have elec trified the whole frame of natural philosophy" (TL, 375). Electricity was a power that could convert the static arrangement of the magnetic field into a space of vital action and movement.28 Magnetism represented the law of polarity, electricity the vitalization or operation of that law. I magnetism demonstrated the law of polarity in inorganic matter, elec tricity could assimilate magnetism to reveal the one power which brings polarity to life in organic matter. The principle of fixity thus fuses with the principle of dynamic motion; or, as he phrases it in a description of artistic beauty, "confining form" unites with the "electrical flashes" o "free life" ("Genial Criticism," 235).
In Biographia Literaria the imagination is an objectified power within the poem and, as such, it is the counterpart to the electrical power i nature described in "Theory of Life." The scientific language with which it is described is indicative of this correspondence: "The primary imagination I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception. . . . The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with th primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, and dissipates, in order to recreate.... It is essentially vital, even as objects (as objects) are essen tially fixed and dead" (BL I, 202; my emphasis) . "This power, first put in action by the will and understanding, and retained under their irremis sive, though gentle and unnoticed control ... reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities" (BL II, 12) . Here the language is that of a scientific experiment in which an electrical force, the imagination, galvanizes different elements that are brought under its power: working together, the will and understanding act as a conducto that organizes a field of "opposite and discordant qualities" which the fusing power of the imagination vitalizes in a manner strikingly similar to the operation of the electrical force found in nature. Shakespeare's work is thus a "growth, evolution" whereby "each line, each word almost, begets the following-and the will of the writer is an interfusion, a continuous agency, no series of separate acts."29 The conducting will unite with the fusing imagination to become "an interfusion, a continuous agen cy" of power and control that at once organizes and activates the multiple elements of a wide and varied experience. The clearest use of electricity in practical criticism is found in Coleridge's analysis of meter. He begins by describing the origins of meter, tracing it "to the balance of the mind effected by the spontaneous effort which strives to hold in check the workings of passion. It might be easily explained likewise in what manner this salutary antagonism is assisted by the very state, which it counteracts; and how this balance of antagonists becomes organized into meter . . . by a supervening act of the will and judgment" (BL II, 50) . Meter, that is, is generated out of a polarity of passion and the controlling effort of the mind which, like the magnetic field, together form a balance of antagonists between which the will intervenes like a conductor. Metrical restraint is then balanced with a language of passion ("as every passion has its proper pulse, so it will likewise have its characteristic mode of expression" (BL II, 56). In short, mental restraint and passion balance in an original act of the mind that results in meter; to create poetry, this metrical framework is in turn bound and balanced with a special, emotional language: "meter therefore having been connected with poetry most often and by a peculiar fitness, whatever else is combined with meter must, though it not be essentially poetic, have nevertheless some property in common with poetry, as an intermedium of affinity, a sort (if I may dare borrow a well-known phrase from technical chemistry) of mordaunt between it and the super-added meter" (BL II, 55). The suggestion here-which could be made only through the scientific language in which it is couched-is that meter can be either an artificial or natural part of a poem in that "an intermedium of affinity" should naturally bind meter to the language of a poem. And although 29 Miscellaneous Criticism, Coleridge never explicitly explains it in terms clear that what activates this affinity is the im describes, with similar scientific language, and unites contrary elements. Where Colerid ance and conjunction between the language of in Wordsworth's "Anecdote for Fathers," " "The Beggars," and "The Sailor's Mother," these poems "would have been delightful... as by Mr. Wordsworth they would have been trian tour" (BL II, 53). About "The Sailor quotes three stanzas and queries "whether in sufficient reason for their being written me referring here, I believe, to the model he has must be a vitalized affinity between the m poem. As the two are joined but not imaginat worth poem, the meter sits oddly on the lan leaves of one flower would look strange if unn of another species.
In "Theory of Life" Coleridge discusses m also in terms of "progressive individuation" a evaluations and judgments in Biographia L ceasing polarity of life" represented by ma "the form of its progress, and its tendency t is "the law of its direction" (TL, 407). Here the form, and what I have associated with each of these passages. As the progressive individuation manifested in the electrical force unites and vitalizes two opposite movements in the life process, in poetry the imagination performs the same task; and, though Coleridge never bluntly states this, he values a work of art most when its centrifugal-centripetal make-up resembles man, the organism in whom the two forces reach their maximum strength and scope, in whom there is the "highest realization and reconciliation of both . . . tendencies, that of most perfect detachment and the greatest possible union" (TL, 422).
Accordingly, if the paramount, most admirable organism is the one that manifests the most detachment with the greatest attachment, in literature most value will be awarded to the work that manifests the greatest individuality with the greatest universality.3" The works of Shakespeare and Milton are Coleridge's examples here. Shakespeare's plays not only have a universal scope and variety but they also contain a proportionate degree of judgment and unity; "in Shakespeare the play is syngensia [a flower species]-each indeed has a life of its own and is an individuum of itself, but yet an organ to the whole.""3 Conversely, while always retaining the stamp of the individual man, the poems of Milton contain the greatest of eternal truths. Wordsworth too is praised as "individualized"; but his characters, unlike Shakespeare's, are faulted as overly peculiar and "incongruous," "for amid the strongest individuation, the character must still remain representative" (BL II, 106-7). Finally, the great philosophical poem that Coleridge expected from Wordsworth would doubtless have been great because, like man, the scope of its vision would have been matched by the strength of its individuality.
I have discussed progressive individuation in its relation to the second power in Coleridge's biological scheme, electricity in nature and the imagination in poetry, since Coleridge most usually associates it with these two phenomena. Yet, as all three powers are bound together in a single organism, so the tendency to individuate cannot be separated from the third power, chemical affinity, which corresponds to the intellectual energy and reason behind a poem. As Coleridge demonstrates throughout "Theory of Life," chemical affinity adds the dimension of depth to an organism when it unites with length and breadth, magnetism and electricity, and Coleridge equates this chemical affinity with sensibility. He describes this third dimension best in a manuscript note:
all that is outside is comprized in length and surface-what remains must therefore be inside-but again, the sole definition of matter is that which fills space -now it is with length, breadth, and length relative to breadth that space is filled. In other words, Space has relation only to the outside. Depth must therefore be that by not with which space is filled . . . it must be that which causes it to be filled, and is therefore the true substance. Depth therefore cannot be an attribute of matter, which (i.e. Length+B mere abstraction, an ens rationis; but it must be is inwardness, outwardness being its effect and m Illustrating inwardness, "the true substan a perilous task for a critic; but nonetheless C what coyly, by locating a particular kind praises the "atmosphere and depth and hei world; and he characterizes the fifth of Wor tative pathos, as "a union of deep and sub (BL II, 122). For Coleridge this is an impo of Wordsworth, and it correlates neatly wit organism-depth, sensibility, and inwardne protean presence but one which most reader in a poem, "thought" is perhaps as specifi third dimensional property in a poem. But h poem is extremely difficult, and this difficu paratively little Coleridge says about dep the poem it dwells in the realm of Colerid "Ideas," clearly distinguished from the imag imagination, Shakespeare possesses another p the former could scarce exist in a high degr ergy of Thought." In an 1818 lecture, Colerid of these two powers, imaginative force and "worked in the spirit of nature, by evolving tive power according to an idea." For, "No m without being at the same time a profoun peare's poems the creative power and the i in a war embrace" (BL II, 19) . The thinke artist, adds a dimension to the poem, so th energy of thought unite in a poem, like elect cal affinity in the life process, to create an and mysterious as the highest organism in n This ultimately mysterious nature of art a gets, no matter how analytical he becomes, a model should never be confused with poeti constituent forces of life are the power of l of surface (electricity), and the power of de itself is neither of these separately, but the Indeed the powers of life may manifest them sible forms, yet "visible surface and power o power of life, are ideas which the forms of it impossible to identify" (TL, 378). Likewise exists beyond the components Coleridge chooses to isolate for criticism, and a critic's most egregious mistake would be to imagine Wordsworth's or any author's poetry simple and containable. What Coleridge and other literary critics can do is to understand and explain life and poetry with language. Precisely because of its linguis nature, this act of understanding will always be an act of commitme and choice-a choice of how he will understand and, subsequently, wh he will understand. Scientific language does not accidentally or inadve tently appear in Biographia Literaria; it is the controlling discourse that Coleridge chooses for good reasons and with full knowledge of its im plications. He recognizes the power of connotations; he recognizes th way different tropes and metaphors could not only organize but produc meanings. He writes about a "fusing power" in a poem entirely conscious of its commensurability with the "fusing power" of electricity. And, de scribing "depth" in a poem or its centripetal-centrifugal balance, Col ridge consciously creates a meaning, a biological meaning, rather th extracting that meaning from a poem. In 1815 the language of science was gaining an authority that could only diminish the authority of other languages: due to the purported objectivity of scientific practice a discourse, scientific statements simply had more validity than poetic or theological statements. For Coleridge, the way to counter this trend was to make a poem mean scientifically, to show that scientific truths are n more confined to science than scientific discourse is the sole property o the laboratory worker. If poetry should never pretend to be science, poetry should never cower before the language of science. Coleridge's scien tific poetics and biological tropes are an important attempt to show that poetry is at least as challenging, mysterious, and intellectually rigoro as the best of modern science.
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